primitive thisness
my friend Gaurav presented me with an argument from Robert Adams:
Consider two spheres, call them A and B, and possible worlds W,
(1) in W1, there are two distinct spheres A and B that are identical in all their properties except that A has some contingent property p,
(2) in W2, there are A and B where everything is the same as in (1) except that B and not A has some contingent property p,
(3) in W3, only A exists, but without p,
(4) in W4, only B exists, but without p,
(5) in W5, both A and B distinctly exist, but neither having p.
The upshot of the argument is that objects aren't individuated in virtue of their properties, but that individuation is not reducible, or primitive. But if you like Leibniz's law, which basically says you can't have two distinct objects with identical properties, you shouldn't like this argument. i don't know what to say about this argument. It feels like there's some sneaky move being made but i can't quite say what. Any thoughts?
Consider two spheres, call them A and B, and possible worlds W,
(1) in W1, there are two distinct spheres A and B that are identical in all their properties except that A has some contingent property p,
(2) in W2, there are A and B where everything is the same as in (1) except that B and not A has some contingent property p,
(3) in W3, only A exists, but without p,
(4) in W4, only B exists, but without p,
(5) in W5, both A and B distinctly exist, but neither having p.
The upshot of the argument is that objects aren't individuated in virtue of their properties, but that individuation is not reducible, or primitive. But if you like Leibniz's law, which basically says you can't have two distinct objects with identical properties, you shouldn't like this argument. i don't know what to say about this argument. It feels like there's some sneaky move being made but i can't quite say what. Any thoughts?
posted by luvell anderson at 7:38 PM
3 Comments:
As an anti-haecceitist, I'd deny that the possible worlds come with the identities of A or B "built in", so to speak. That is, if possible worlds are fundamentally qualitative, then there are not two distinct worlds W1 and W2, which are qualitatively identical but somehow differing in the numerical identity of their constituents. More generally, Adams is begging the question when he builds these haecceital claims into his world-descriptions.
Hi Richard,
thanx for your comment. also, i hope you are settling in nicely at princeton ...
suppose we consider the actual world which contains, among other things, you; call you Richard 1. now consider a world descriptively identical to the actual one. however, everything in this second world, call it W 2, is a replica of everything in W 1. so, instead of Richard 1, it contains an android, call it Richard 2, that's descriptively identical with Richard 1.
it seems like both of these worlds could exist simultaneously. let's say a mad scientist created W 2. if there are no haecceities, why wouldn't it be possible to create some object X2 that's qualitatively identical to X1?
It seems they would then have different extrinsic/relational properties. But suppose not. I think I can grant the possibility of perfect qualitative duplicates (e.g. in a symmetric world). I'm more just denying the substance of trans-world identity claims. So if we imagine a third, merely possible Richard, there's no deep further fact of the matter as to whether he's Richard1 or Richard2. The qualitative facts exhaust the facts.
(P.S. Thanks! I've got another month here in NZ before the big move, though...)
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